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SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON: STEPPING BACK FROM THE NEW
WORLD COURT ORDER
by
Julian G. Ku
Over the past few decades, international law scholars and advocates
have widely supported the use of domestic United States courts to
independently enforce and implement internationaltribunal judgments,
even over the opposition of the President. The Supreme Court's decision
in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon represents a potentially serious setbackfor
this burgeoning movement. This contribution defends and elaborates the
reasons for the Court's refusal in Sanchez-Llamas to give effect to
judgments of an international tribunal absent a clear and explicit
authorizationby Congress or the Senate.
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INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War era has witnessed renewed interest in the use of
international tribunals I to resolve interstate conflicts and to develop broad
Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank
John Parry for organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate. Some of the ideas
from this Article were developed in an amicus brief I signed in Medellin v. Dretke and
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, as well as in numerous posts at the author's weblog Opinio Juris
(http://opiniojuris.org). All errors and omissions, of course, remain my own.
For my purposes, the term "international tribunal" refers to any international
institution holding the authority to impose binding obligations on nations arising out of a
dispute over the requirements of international law. The term "international tribunal," which
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principles of international law. This rise of international tribunals coincides
with a broad movement among scholars and advocates supporting the use of
domestic courts to enforce and implement international tribunal judgments. In
this view, domestic courts should act independently to comply with
international tribunal judgments with little or no interference by the legislative
or executive branches of a nation's government. In prior work, I have described
this view of the relationship between
domestic courts and international
2
tribunals as a "new world court order."
This movement, which has achieved wide academic support, suffered a
severe setback in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2006 decision Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon.3 In that decision, the Court squarely considered the domestic status of
binding international tribunal judgments for the first time. Indeed, not only did
the petitioners in these cases ask the Court to defer to the interpretation of U.S.
treaty obligations by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but some of the
leading academic proponents of the new world court order filed an amicus brief
arguing that the Supreme Court was obligated to follow the ICJ's judgments,
even if such judgments conflicted with prior Supreme Court precedents or the
opinions of the U.S. Executive Branch.4
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' views on the proper
interpretation of the treaty in question, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR).5 Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion also went farther
by specifically rejecting the treaty interpretations reached by the ICJ. The Court
then went out of its way to dismiss the new world court order argument that
judgments of the ICJ bound the Supreme Court's resolution of the case. 6 Even
the dissent failed to embrace
this view and simply argued that the ICJ's opinion
7
deserved more deference.
Although the most aggressive conception of the new world court order was
thus soundly rejected by the Court, the majority failed to offer a detailed
explanation for its refusal to treat ICJ orders as binding. Nor did it offer a welldeveloped analytical framework for assessing the status of international
is the term used in federal statutory law, includes a variety of international adjudicatory
bodies, some of which might call themselves "courts." See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000)
("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal
accusation.").
2

Julian G. Ku, InternationalDelegationsand the New World Court Order, 81

WASH.

L. REv. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Ku,InternationalDelegations].
3 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).
4 See Reply Brief for Petitioner Sanchez-Llamas, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2006 WL 598180; Brief of International Court of Justice
Experts As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct.
2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3597806.
5 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
6 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2680.
7 Id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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tribunal judgments. Such flaws are important because, although litigation over
8
the ICJ's interpretations of the VCCR is largely at an end, the U.S. remains a
party to dozens of similar treaties allocating jurisdiction
9 to the ICJ and is also a
party to numerous other international tribunal systems.
This Essay attempts to fill in some of the analytical gaps left open by the
Sanchez-Llamas Court. The Court's approach does represent a step in the right
direction. By emphasizing the difference between an international tribunal
judgment's international and domestic effect and its consideration of the views
of the executive branch, the Court respected the constitutional allocation of
foreign policy discretion to the executive branch while preserving its own final
authority to determine the proper interpretation of treaties for the domestic
system. Such an approach avoids potentially serious constitutional concerns
about the excessive delegation of foreign policy authority to international
tribunals. As I have argued previously, domestic U.S. courts should require a
clear statement by either the treaty-makers or Congress prior to giving binding
effect to the judgment of an international tribunal.' 0 The Court's majority
opinion does not specify such a rule, but it does leave room for such a
requirement.
This short Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, I outline the key premises
undergirding the new world court order and describe how these premises
manifested themselves in arguments to the Court in Sanchez-Llamas. I go on in
Part III to consider the Sanchez-Llamas Court's treatment of these arguments
for giving binding effect to judgments by the ICJ. I conclude in Part IV by
offering a broader constitutional and functional rationale for the SanchezLlamas Court's rejection of the new world court order and a brief outline of an
alternative analytical framework for incorporating international tribunal
judgments into the domestic U.S. legal system.

8 The U.S. withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations in 2005. See Letter from Condoleeza Rice, Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan,
Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations (March 7, 2005), cited in Sanchez-Llamas, 126 U.S. at
2675 (majority opinion).

9 See Fred L. Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S.
Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58 (Lori Fisler

Damrosch ed., 1987); see also Ku, International Delegations, supra note 2, at 31-35
(describing U.S. participation in international dispute resolution).
10 Ku, InternationalDelegations,supra note 2, at 65-69.
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II. THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
JUDGMENTS

A.

A New World Court Order

By one count, there are over 100 international tribunals and institutions
operating today." The wide proliferation of international tribunals, however,
has not resolved the difficult problem of winning enforcement of international
tribunal judgments. Unlike domestic courts, an international tribunal's
judgment is rarely backed by an executive body with enforcement power.12
One way to ensure compliance with international tribunal judgments is to
seek enforcement by the domestic court of the state suffering the adverse
judgment. This approach is favored by a number of leading scholars in the U.S.
who advocate using the interaction between international tribunals and national
courts to foster compliance by states with international law. Although these
scholars approach the proper relationship between international tribunals and
domestic courts in different ways, all share a number of important assumptions
about the central and perhaps dominant role of domestic courts in the
implementation of international tribunal judgments. 13
First, such scholars generally believe that domestic courts have the
authority and the obligation to conduct their own determination of the legal
effect of international tribunal judgments even when they have been asked by
the political branches not to do so. Second, domestic courts have the authority
and the obligation to consider various factors, including international relations
and the international rule of law, in making this determination.15 Third,
domestic courts have a responsibility to encourage or even force state
compliance with international legal rules as interpreted by international
tribunals.' 6
These views are indicative of what I have called a "new world court
order"'17 where international relations becomes increasingly shaped by the
See Project on Int'l Courts & Tribunals, The International Judiciary in Context: A
Synoptic
Chart (Nov. 2004), http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/
SynopC4.pdf (identifying 125 international bodies that have international dispute resolution
features in common).
12 The closest international analog to a domestic court's reliance on police and other
executive officials to enforce its judgments is the U.N. Security Council, which is designated
to "make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to" an ICJ
judgment. U.N. Charter art. 94(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
13 For an extended discussion of the scholarly movement along these lines, see Ku,
InternationalDelegations,supra note 2, at 35-41.
14 See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty
Violation, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697, 703 (1998).
15 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 26
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 791-92 (1998).
16 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-100 (2004).
17 Ku, InternationalDelegations,supra note 2, at 2.
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actions of independent international tribunals, and where domestic courts
become the leading players in controlling a nation's relationship with such
tribunals.
B.

The New World Court OrderFiles an Amicus Brief

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon gave academic proponents of a new world
court order an opportunity to present their views to the Supreme Court.
Although the Court was presented with a variety of questions mostly related to
the effect of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on state criminal
justice, the Court also granted certiorari to consider the effect of the ICJ's
decisions interpreting U.S. obligations under the VCCR. For this reason, a
number of leading scholars, many of whom are also prominent academic
proponents of the new world court order, filed an amicus brief focused
exclusively on the legal effect of the ICJ's judgments.
Styled as a brief of "International Court of Justice Experts," the brief
argued that the Supreme Court should follow the ICJ's interpretations of the
VCCR despite prior inconsistent precedent from the Supreme Court as well as
opposition from the executive branch. In support of this view, the brief focused
on the legal status of the ICJ's judgments as a matter of domestic U.S. law.
The brief began by arguing that the ICJ's judgments "constitute the
authoritative interpretation of the [VCCR] as regards nationals of treaty parties
who have been sentenced to severe penalties without having been informed of
their treaty rights." 18 As an "authoritative interpretation" of the treaty, the ICJ's
interpretations bound the United States even in the application of the treaty
toward nationals of countries that did not participate in the ICJ proceedings.
The brief then emphasized that the ICJ judgments "resulted from a treatybased dispute settlement process to which the United States fully consented, in
which the United States fully participated, and which produced an
interpretation of the Vienna Convention that removes any doubt about the
''9
obligations of the United States as a whole toward nationals of treaty parties."
The fact that the U.S. government opposed the ICJ's interpretation of the
VCCR obligations and continued to oppose it in briefs filed before the SanchezLlamas Court should not, the brief argued, affect the Court's disposition of the
case. Although the executive's views on treaty interpretation are entitled to
deference, the brief asserted that "this Court should endorse the Executive's
views that are compatible with protecting foreign nationals in accordance with
Avena but not follow Executive positions that would give foreign nationals a
lesser level of protection than they are entitled to enjoy under Avena's
interpretation of the [VCCR]." 2 °
Thus, because the U.S. government had consented to have disputes under
the VCCR resolved by the ICJ via an Optional Protocol to the VCCR, the U.S.
18 Brief of International Court of Justice Experts, supra note 4, at 2.
at 2-3.
Id. at 28.

'9 Id.

20
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government had in effect signed a "forum selection clause" selecting the ICJ as
the forum. The selection of the ICJ to resolve all VCCR disputes means that
"the United States is obligated to comply with the Convention, as interpreted
by the ICJ."21
The briefs description of the Optional Protocol as a forum selection clause
was a shrewd one, since the Supreme Court has consistently favored judicial
resolution of such clauses in the context of private commercial disputes. The
analogy is not exactly correct, however, because even if a domestic court
enforces a forum selection clause, it may not necessarily enforce the judgment
that results from the selected forum. That question of enforcement, which is
more applicable to the situation in Sanchez-Llamas, is generally a separate
question. Still, the analogy reflected the briefs assumption that an international
tribunal judgment imposing a binding obligation on the U.S. government
should be treated no differently than a binding obligation on a private party in a
commercial dispute. In such an instance, as the brief argued, the ICJ's
interpretation of the VCCR "provide[s] the basis for the rule of decision which
[the] Court should instruct state courts to follow." 22 Moreover, the decision is
for the Court rather than any other branch of government.
In interpreting the legal obligations of the United States in the instant
case, it would be no mark of disrespect to the Executive Branch, but a
justified assertion of the role of this Court consistent with the principle of
separation of powers, if the Court, as Amici urge, exercises its
independent23judgment to accept the interpretation embodied in LaGrand
and Avena.
This statement encapsulates much of the new world court order's views about
the proper role of domestic courts in the implementation and enforcement of
international tribunal judgments. In this view, courts have an independent
obligation to implement and enforce international legal obligations of the U.S.
government. Indeed, such an obligation extends to a duty to follow and
interpret legal obligations that the executive branch itself continues to reject.
III. THE ROBERTS COURT FACES THE NEW WORLD COURT ORDER
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the ICJ's
interpretation of the VCCR. But he went further and squarely rejected the ICJ
Experts' claim that the ICJ's judgment had some sort of binding effect on the
Court. Although his opinion for the Court refused to endorse the tenets of the
new world court order, it did not fully explain or justify its alternative approach
to dealing with binding international tribunal judgments such as those
promulgated by the ICJ.

21

Id. at 11.

22 Id. at 20.
23

Id. at 30.
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The Court's analysis began with the VCCR itself rather than with the ICJ's
interpretation of the treaty. It refused to accept the petitioners' reading of the
treaty, which sought the suppression of evidence as a remedy for VCCR
violations and the exemption of VCCR claims for standard procedural default
requirements in state courts. The Court had little trouble in its first holding and
decided that the VCCR did not require the suppression of evidence seized in
violation of the treaty. 24 The Court also had little difficulty finding against the
petitioners in their second claim, holding that its prior 1998 decision in Breard
v. Greene25 should be followed, and that treaty claims, like all other federal
claims, should be subject to the procedural default doctrine.26
Having disposed of both petitioners' arguments, the Court paused to
consider what it called a "less easily dismissed" reason for revisiting its holding
in Breard; namely, the ICJ's subsequent judgments in La Grand and Avena. 27 In
those decisions, the ICJ interpreted the VCCR to preclude the application of
procedural default rules against claims asserting VCCR violations. 2' The
question for the Court, therefore, was whether these subsequent judgments
required, or at least warranted, a reconsideration of its previous holding in
Breard.
The Court thus directly focused on the effect of the ICJ's rulings rather
than the treaty itself. It had not addressed these issues in its previous forays into
the VCCR litigation. Having directly considered the issue, it then offered a
straightforward conclusion. Although "the ICJ's interpretation deserves
'respectful consideration,' . . . it does not compel us to reconsider our
' 29
understanding of the [VCCR] in Breard.
The Court offered three reasons for adhering to its prior holding in Breard
and refusing to follow the ICJ's interpretation. First, it relied on its exclusive
authority to interpret treaties as a matter of U.S. domestic law, citing Article III
of the U.S. Constitution's extension of the "judicial power" to treaties. To the
extent treaties are given effect as federal law, the Court suggested, the
Constitution allocates the power to interpret those laws to the federal judiciary
alone. The Court emphasized that the President's decision to sign, and the
Senate's decision to give advice and consent to the VCCR took place in the
background of this understanding
of the federal courts' supreme and final
30
authority over treaties.
Second, "[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its
interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts." 3' Per the ICJ's
24 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2678-82 (2006).
25 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
26 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682-83.
27 Id. at 2683.
28 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
29 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2683 (quoting Breard,523 U.S. at 375).
30 Id. at 2684.
31 Id.
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own Statute, any interpretation of the ICJ is only binding on the parties in a
particular case and has no binding precedential force on subsequent cases. The
Court reasoned that it is therefore unlikely that such decisions "were intended
to be controlling on our courts." 32 Further, while all parties to the ICJ Statute,
including the U.S., are obligated to comply with decisions of the ICJ, the
remedies for noncompliance consist of referral to the U.N.
33 Security Council.
Such referrals are "quintessentially international remedies."
Finally, the Court emphasized that the executive branch did not accept the
ICJ's interpretations of the VCCR as binding on U.S. courts. This matters
because "'[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given
them by departments of governments particularly charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."' 34 In other words, the
contrary views of the executive branch weighed against giving the ICJ
interpretations "decisive weight" in the manner sought by the petitioners and
the amici.
The Court therefore concluded that the ICJ's interpretations deserved only
"'respectful consideration"' and further concluded that the ICJ's interpretation
of the VCCR could not "overcome the plain import of' the VCCR provision in
question. 35 It was the Court's application of the "respectful consideration"
standard that divided it most sharply from Justice Breyer's dissent.
Interestingly, Justice Breyer had previously filed an unusually long dissent
from denial of certiorari in similar VCCR/ICJ cases arguing, along the lines of
the new world court order, that the ICJ's interpretations were "authoritative."
Here, however, he did not even attempt to offer a defense of this view and
contented himself with challenging the majority's interpretation of the VCCR
more than the lack of consideration the majority provided to the ICJ's views.
Perhaps for this reason, the majority opinion's explanation for why it was not
bound by the ICJ's interpretations, while persuasive, was also relatively
undeveloped.
IV. TOWARD A CLEAR STATEMENT RULE FOR IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL JUDGMENTS
The Court's opinion plainly rejected the most aggressive view of the ICJ's
authority endorsed by leading academic proponents of the new world court
order. The Court even quoted from the Brief of the ICJ Experts in order to
make clear that it was disagreeing with their views in particular. 36 But the
brevity of the Court's analysis of the status of ICJ judgments leaves much to be
desired for those seeking to develop a fuller analytical framework for

32

Id.

33 Id. at 2685 (italics removed).
34 Id. (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).

35Id. (quoting Breard,523 U.S. at 375).
36 Id. at 2683.
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understanding the domestic effect of international tribunal judgments in the
U.S.
A.

Explaining Sanchez-Llamas

Most importantly, the Court's opinion did not offer a clear constitutional
or functional rationale for rejecting the binding effect of ICJ judgments. For
instance, the Court's citation to Article III's allocation of judicial power to the
courts suggests, but does not establish, a constitutional obstacle to treating
international tribunal judgments as binding. After all, courts in the U.S. have
regularly 37enforced judgments of foreign courts without finding an Article III
problem.
The Court's subsequent explanation that the treaty-makers (the President
and the Senate) acted with the understanding that the courts held final
interpretive authority for the domestic effect of the VCCR offers a possible
explanation. To the extent that the President and Senate are understood to have
delegated some authority to the ICJ to interpret the VCCR, the President and
Senate also acted with the understanding that U.S. courts would have the final
word with respect to the domestic effect of the same treaties. Treating ICJ
judgments as binding would not honor this basic understanding that prevailed
at the time the treaty was entered into.
The Court's analysis of the limited precedential effect of ICJ judgments,
while accurate, also only hinted at the proper way to analyze the domestic
effect of other international tribunal judgments. The ICJ, the Court emphasized,
is only empowered to decide disputes between particular parties and its
decisions have no precedential effect. 38 But does that mean that in cases where
the ICJ's decision is directly applicable-such as the petitions filed the
previous term by a Mexican national named Jose Medellin that were the subject
of the ICJ's decision in Avena-the ICJ's decision is binding?
This seems doubtful because the Court highlighted the non-judicial
mechanisms for enforcement of ICJ judgments in the U.N. Charter. 39 Here, the
Court's analysis provides some guidance for future cases because the existence
of such political enforcement mechanisms, the Court's decision strongly
suggests, precludes a domestic court from reaching out to give domestic
judicial effect to ICJ judgments. Such political enforcement mechanisms,
indeed, might make it improper for the Court to interfere by enforcing a
judgment that its own government has chosen to enforce in a different way or
not at all.

37

See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

38

See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.

1055, T.S. No. 993 (stating that ICJ decisions have "no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case").
39 See U.N. Charter, supra note 12, art. 94(2) (providing for referral to Security Council
in cases of noncompliance).
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It may seem shocking that a nation may choose not to comply with an
otherwise valid international legal obligation. But the power of the U.S.
political branches to violate or refuse to comply with international legal
obligations, even treaty obligations, is well established. That congressional
statutes superseding treaties will be given effect by the last-in-time rule and the
international law have both
President's power to supersede a rule of customary
40
been long recognized by the Supreme Court.
But even if a country does not choose to violate international legal
obligations interpreted by an international tribunal, it may still want to use nonjudicial domestic mechanisms for complying with such obligations. In the case
of the ICJ's decision in Avena, the U.S. executive issued a memorandum
declaring that U.S. policy would seek enforcement of that decision through
state rather than federal courts. 4 1 In many other circumstances, such as U.S.
compliance with decisions of the World Trade Organization's dispute
settlement bodies, only the executive and the legislature42has the authority to
decide how and whether to bring the U.S into compliance.
This last observation fits nicely into the Court's final rationale for refusing
to treat the ICJ's judgment as binding: the contrary views of the executive
branch. The Court did not treat the executive's views of the ICJ interpretations
as binding, but it cited the longstanding doctrinal obligation to give executive
interpretations "great weight." Given this traditional deference to executive
branch interpretations, the Court rightly refused to ignore this doctrine by
instead giving decisive weight to an international tribunal over that of the
executive branch. Given the long tradition of non-judicial enforcement of
international tribunal judgments and the actual non-judicial mechanisms for
enforcement contained in the ICJ system itself, the Court wisely gave greater
weight to the executive branch.

40 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888) (applying last in time

rule); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary international

law rule may be superseded by a controlling executive act). For a fuller discussion of the
last-in-time rule, see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for
Treaties and FederalStatutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005).
41 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41-42, Medellin
v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490 (citing Memorandum from
President George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005)).
42 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b) (2000) (delegating to the Commerce Department the
power to comply with WTO tribunal decisions). See also Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000) (barring anyone other than the United States from
challenging U.S. or state action or inaction based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round
Agreements); URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 675-77, 1043-44 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4040, 4054-56, 4327. For a fuller discussion, see Ku, InternationalDelegations, supra note
2, at 46-47.
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Toward a Clear Statement Rule

The Court's refusal to treat the ICJ's judgments as binding thus has a solid
constitutional and functional basis. The constitutional framework ensures that
the domestic effect of all laws, including treaties, is a question over which U.S.
courts have the final say. Departing from this understanding would result in
treaty-makers delegating final authority over domestic U.S. law to international
tribunals, without realizing that they had done so. Such a mindless delegation
seems especially implausible here, where the structure of the ICJ system seems
to rely on case-specific dispute resolution and political enforcement through the
Security Council. In any event, the views of the executive branch, the
institution charged with the negotiation and ratification of treaties as well as the
management of overall foreign policy, deserve at least as much weight, if not
more, than that of an international tribunal.
But does the Court's holding foreclose any judicial role in the enforcement
of international tribunal judgments? Such a drastic view could severely limit
the ability of the U.S. to participate in certain international dispute resolution
systems. For instance, the International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("IC SID") requires member states to enforce judgments of
international arbitral tribunals convened under the treaty.43 Indeed, Congress
has passed a federal statute specifically
requiring U.S. courts to give full faith
44
and credit to such judgments. Similarly, Congress has transferred appellate
authority over certain decisions of the International Trade Commission to
binational panels convened pursuant to the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Such statutes plainly remove any question about the views of the
legislative branch as to the role of domestic courts in this process. For this
reason, as I have argued elsewhere, such clear statements should be honored by
courts as an expression of the combined political judgment of the legislative
and executive branches about the proper method for ensuring domestic

43 International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm:

"Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A
Contracting 'State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if
it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state."
44 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2000):
"An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID]
convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The
pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given
the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction of one of the several States."
41 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (2000) (authorizing binational panels to direct U.S.
agencies to "take action not inconsistent with the decision of the panel").
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enforcement of international tribunal judgments. 46 Requiring a clear statement
will also usefully encourage the political branches to specify when and how
such international judgments should be implemented, as they did in the case of
the ICSID Convention.
A robust reading of Article III that may be gleaned from the Court's
opinion in Sanchez-Llamas, however, would prevent a court from giving effect
to such a clear statement of congressional intent. To be sure, the Court in
Sanchez-Llamas was hardly faced with a clear statement of either legislative or
executive intent in favor of direct enforcement of ICJ judgments. Indeed, it was
faced with silence on the part of the legislature and strong opposition on the
part of the executive. There is little reason to believe, therefore, that the Court's
opinion has affected the viability of such clear statements.
V. CONCLUSION
The most extreme form of the new world court order has suffered a
substantial setback. Not one justice endorsed or adopted the view that the ICJ's
judgments have binding effect on U.S. courts. Moreover, a solid majority of
justices appear to have adopted a skeptical view of the more moderate efforts to
encourage judicial comity and deference to international court decisions.
Sanchez-Llamas does not, however, mean that the U.S. must turn its back
on greater judicial cooperation with international courts. Rather, SanchezLlamas may signal a return to the old world court order of political control over
compliance with most international institutions. In the modern era of increased
interaction with international tribunals, political control over compliance will
likely take the form of a clear statement rule indicating the political branches'
acceptance of judicial deference or enforcement of international court
judgments. Although rare, such clear statements do indeed exist. And requiring
such a statement is the most sensible and modest approach to the challenges
posed by the rise of international tribunals.

46

See Ku, InternationalDelegations,supra note 2, at 65-69.

